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The trading of property catastrophe risk using standard financial instruments such as options
and bonds enables insurance companies to hedge their exposure by transferring risk to
investors, who take positions on the occurrence and cost of catastrophes. Although these 
property catastrophe risk instruments are relatively new products, they have already 
established an important link between the insurance industry and the U.S. capital market.
The costs of property catastrophes in the United States
have reached unprecedented levels.1 Between 1989 and
1995, total insured losses from earthquakes, hurri-
canes, and other natural disasters amounted to $75 bil-
lion, compared with only $51 billion between 1950 and
1988. The increased frequency and size of catastrophes
have fueled the 1989-95 upsurge:  catastrophes aver-
aged thirty-five per year, as opposed to just twenty-five
per year over the entire 1950-88 period, while the aver-
age insured loss per catastrophe reached $302 million,
up from just $56 million.2
The enormous costs of property catastrophes have
underscored the risks borne by insurance companies.3
To minimize their aggregate risk, insurance companies
spread insurance risk over a large number of policy-
holders and purchase reinsurance (insurance for insur-
ance companies). Until recently,  these have been the
only mechanisms available for transferring insurance
risk. However, increased catastrophe risk, coupled with
limitations on insurers’use of traditional risk-reduction
alternatives, has led to the development of another
method of transferring insurance risk:  securitization.
Since 1992, financial market innovations have
enabled property catastrophe risk to be securitized—
that is, traded by using standard financial instruments
such as options and bonds. These instruments have cre-
ated, for the first time, a direct link between the insur-
ance industry and the capital market. Individuals and
businesses can take positions on the occurrence and
cost of property catastrophes, just as they can hedge or
speculate on the movement of interest rates or crop
prices. Insurance companies, in turn, can hedge their
exposure by transferring property catastrophe risk to a
wide pool of willing investors.
In this edition of Current Issues, we examine the
development of catastrophe risk financial instruments.
We describe catastrophe options and bonds, which are
currently trading, and property catastrophe swaps, which
are scheduled to begin trading later this year. We show
that each instrument trades a distinct type of catastrophe
risk and has unique investment risk characteristics. 
Evidence for Increased Catastrophe Risk 
Rising catastrophe-related costs provide clear evidence
that catastrophe risk has increased significantly in
recent years. As noted, both the total cost and the aver-
age cost of catastrophes between 1989 and 1995 were
the highest of any period since 1950 (see chart). In fact,
total insured losses for this seven-year period were 
50 percent higher than they were for the entire thirty-
eight-year period before it.
Rapid population growth in areas vulnerable to 
catastrophes also indicates a continuing trend toward
increased catastrophe costs. The states most at risk—
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prone regions:  the Atlantic and Gulf coast regions of
Florida and Texas are exposed to hurricanes, and much
of California is vulnerable to earthquakes.4 In each of
these states, the population grew more than twice as
much as the U.S. population between 1980 and 1993
(Table 1). As a result of this accelerated growth, 25 per-
cent of the U.S. population now resides in the three states.
The rise in the proportion of individuals buying
insurance in the last ten years also suggests an increase
in catastrophe exposure. Approximately 76 percent of
U.S. households had insurance in 1993, compared with
70 percent in 1984. The rise was due to a 46 percent
jump in the proportion of renters with insurance.5
Obstacles to Managing Catastrophe Risk
Insurers can respond to increased insurance exposure in
a number of ways. They can reduce aggregate risk by
diversifying across different types of exposures.
Writing policies in several states reduces the proportion
of policies in high-catastrophe-risk areas. To offset the
additional risk assumed, they can also raise high-risk
policyholders’premiums. Alternatively, insurers may
attempt to reduce the supply of insurance in high-risk
areas, either by lowering the amount of coverage or by
decreasing the number of policies. They may also use
reinsurance to pass on additional risk.
However, many factors limit the use of these alterna-
tives. The benefits of further diversification are negli-
gible because most insurance companies are already
diversified across areas. Using data from 1994, we
found that only 1 percent of insurance companies were
concentrated in any of the three high-catastrophe-risk
states.6 Because these insurers sold a very small pro-
portion of the total insurance in California, Florida, and
Texas, their efforts to diversify would have minimal
influence on the industry.7
Insurers also have few opportunities to manage addi-
tional catastrophe risk through premium rate increases
and withdrawal from certain insurance markets.
Although premium rate regulation varies by state and
type of insurance, rate changes in California, Florida,
and Texas require approval by the state insurance 
regulator. The timing and size of premium increases are
significantly restricted in these high-risk states. In
addition, insurance companies’attempts to exit high-
catastrophe-risk insurance markets have been con-
strained by legislation in several states. For example,
Florida has limited the number of policies an insurance
company can drop upon policy expiration and
California requires insurance companies to offer earth-
quake insurance with homeowners insurance policies.
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Table 1
Population Growth in Catastrophe-Prone States
Growth Population as a 





United States 13 100
Source:  U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United
States, 1994.
Billions of dollars
Source:  Property Claim Services.￿
Note:  Figures are in 1995 dollars and have been adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index as of year-end 1995.
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Insured Losses Due to Property Catastrophes, 1950-95Higher reinsurance prices and reduced coverage
amounts have hampered insurance companies’efforts to
reduce their risk through reinsurance. Average reinsur-
ance prices increased by 126 percent between 1985 and
1994. Reinsurers also raised their “attachment point” 
73 percent between 1985 and 1994. The attachment
point, which functions like a deductible, must be reached
before the reinsurer pays a percentage of the insurer’s
claims. In addition, the maximum amount of coverage
available to a single insurance company declined 
from $251 million in 1990 to $240 million in 1995.8
Regulatory restrictions also prevent insurance compa-
nies from responding to higher reinsurance costs by rais-
ing premiums and decreasing coverage.
Property Catastrophe Risk Financial Instruments 
Faced with increased catastrophe risk and limited
means of transferring it, insurance companies in the
early 1990s sought an alternative to traditional methods
of managing their risk load. That alternative emerged in
the form of insurance-based financial instruments such
as options, bonds, and swaps.9 The instruments, which
securitize property catastrophe risk, enable insurers to
reduce that risk by passing it on to investors, who take
positions on the occurrence and cost of catastrophes.10
Exchange-traded insurance options and futures began
trading in 1992, over-the-counter insurance products
were first issued in 1994, and insurance swaps are
expected to begin trading later this year. 
Each instrument trades a different type of catastrophe
risk and has distinct investment risk characteristics.
Catastrophe risk exposures can be specified by loca-
tion, peril (such as hurricane, tornado, or earthquake),
and time of year. Instrument design determines which
participants bear which type of investment risk:  liquid-
ity risk, basis risk, credit risk, moral hazard, and
adverse selection (see box). 
Property Catastrophe Options. Property catastro-
phe options are standardized financial instruments
traded through the Chicago Board of Trade.11 Buyers
and sellers of these call and put options either hedge or
speculate on the occurrence of a catastrophe and the
resulting amount of claim payments. Typically, an
option provides the right to buy or sell an underlying
asset at a fixed price (called the strike price), and the
option’s value depends on the asset’s price relative to
the strike price. But with catastrophe options, an under-
lying asset does not exist, so an index is used in lieu of
an asset price. The index is an estimate of the industry’s
total claim payments for catastrophes occurring within
the contract period and specified region. The difference
between the strike price and the index at the option’s
expiration determines the option’s value. 
Buyers and sellers of these options take a position on
the claims of the insurance industry that relate to prop-
erty catastrophe. The buyer of a call option receives a
payoff if the industry claims exceed the amount speci-
fied by the strike price. Most trades create call
spreads—a trading strategy in which a market partici-
pant simultaneously buys a call at one strike price and
sells another call at a higher strike price, with both calls
expiring on the same date. Buying a call spread is com-
parable to purchasing a layer of insurance coverage.
The most commonly traded call spread is illustrated 
in Table 2. 
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Risk Characteristics of Insurance-Based Financial Instruments
Liquidity risk 
Liquidity refers to an investor’s ability to trade quickly at
prices that reflect current market demand and supply condi-
tions. An illiquid market is often characterized by low trad-
ing volume and frequency. In an illiquid market, liquidity
risk affects all market participants. 
Basis risk
Basis risk occurs when cash flows from the hedging instru-
ment do not exactly offset cash flows from the instrument
being hedged. For property catastrophe securities, it arises
when the counterparty’s payments are based not on the
insurer’s claim payments but on an industry average. 
Credit risk
Credit risk arises from the possibility of nonpayment due to
counterparty default.
Adverse selection
Adverse selection exists when a seller has private informa-
tion about the true quality of its products. If the market
price reflects average product quality, the seller has an
incentive to sell products of below-average quality at that
price. For property catastrophe securities, adverse selection
may exist if the sellers (the insurance companies) alone
know the true risk of their policies and if security prices
reflect the average risk of all policies. Under these condi-
tions, insurance companies may have an incentive to trade
high-risk policies, and high-risk insurance companies may
have a particular incentive to trade property catastrophe
securities.
Moral hazard
Moral hazard exists when one party can take actions that
affect the value of a transaction, but the actions cannot be
monitored by the counterparty. For buyers of property 
catastrophe securities, it is the risk that, subsequent to the
purchase, the buyers cannot accurately monitor whether
insurers are properly managing the risk of policies uponLiquidity risk is a concern with property catastrophe
options. Instruments with low trading volumes tend 
to have high liquidity risk since market participants can-
not easily find counterparties to their trades. Property
catastrophe options trade in relatively low volumes. For
example, between October 1995 and April 1996 the aver-
age monthly volume of catastrophe options traded was
approximately 450, compared with 167,000 per instru-
ment for all options on futures traded on the Chicago
Board of Trade.
Several features of the property catastrophe options
market may, however, lead to increased volume and
lower liquidity risk in the future. For instance, noninsur-
ance entities can participate in the market, enabling
them for the first time to take positions on industrywide
property catastrophe risk. Otherwise, they could take
positions only on individual companies by purchasing
stock or over-the-counter products. Moreover, the 
standardized nature of catastrophe options ensures
familiarity with these instruments and facilitates market
participation. Insurers and reinsurers should be attracted
to the options because of their market transparency
(real-time dissemination of trading information) and the
variety of contract types, some simulating a traditional
reinsurance contract and others providing targeted 
coverage.12
The other notable features of these options are
directly related to the four other types of risk. The
credit risk faced by all participants is minimized by the
Chicago Board of Trade clearinghouse, which ensures
the financial integrity of all futures and option con-
tracts traded on its exchange. Only insurance compa-
nies face basis risk, since an option payoff is based on
the aggregate industry claim payments and is unlikely
to offset an individual company’s claim payments. The
risks of adverse selection and moral hazard, faced by
the entity assuming risk (the seller of a call spread), are
minimized by the standardized nature of the options
and by an industry-based index. Standardized instru-
ments prevent insurers from selecting only high-risk
policies for trade. The use of an industry-based index
means that the insurer bears any costs related to the risk
and management of its policies.13
Over-the-Counter Products. The over-the-counter
market has introduced two types of catastrophe risk
instruments: contingent surplus notes and catastrophe
bonds (also called act-of-God bonds). To date, only one
contingent surplus note transaction has been com-
pleted, by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company. This
transaction did not entail the immediate issuance of
surplus notes.14 Instead, Nationwide retained the option
to issue up to $400 million in surplus notes to a guaran-
teed buyer, a Nationwide trust. Thus, investors did not
buy surplus notes; they purchased bonds issued by the
trust. These Nationwide trust bonds are backed by U.S.
Treasury securities. However, if Nationwide exercises
its option to issue surplus notes to the trust, the collat-
eral backing the Nationwide trust bonds held by
investors would change from U.S. Treasury securities to
Nationwide surplus notes. In this case, the trust would
sell its holdings of U.S. Treasury securities to finance
the purchase of Nationwide’s surplus notes. Whether or
not Nationwide issues surplus notes, investors receive
the same coupon payments. 
Although the Nationwide trust bonds provide a
higher coupon rate than U.S. Treasury securities,
investors bear the risk that the collateral on their invest-
ment may change from U.S. Treasury securities to
Nationwide surplus notes. For Nationwide, the primary
advantage of the contingent surplus note structure is
that in the event of a catastrophe, it would have imme-
diate access to cash because the trust serves as a guar-
anteed buyer of Nationwide’s surplus notes. 
Unlike contingent surplus notes, catastrophe bonds
create a direct relationship between repayment and 
catastrophe. The repayment terms vary by issuance. For
example, an insurance company would issue a five-year
bond providing a fixed coupon rate for the first two
years. If a catastrophe occurred and the associated
insured losses reached the specified amount, the
coupon rate would decline to a new fixed rate for the
next three years; otherwise, the rate would remain at the
initial fixed rate. Repayment of principal can also be
linked to catastrophic occurrence. 
Contingent surplus notes and catastrophe bonds
share several investment risk characteristics. Low vol-
ume exposes investors in both instruments to liquidity
risk, much as it does with participants in the property
catastrophe option market. Moreover, the customized
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Table 2
Catastrophe Option Call Spread
Option Trade
Suppose a market participant ...
buys a call with a strike price of 20 index points (equivalent to 
$2 billion of insurance claims)
and
sells a call with a strike price of 30 index points (equivalent to 
$3 billion of insurance claims)
Payoff
If industry claims are: the payoff is:
less than $2 billion $0
greater than $2 billion $200 for every point over
and less than $3 billion 20 index points
greater than $3 billion $2,000 ($200 X 10 points)
Note:  The payoff depends on the amount of insurance claims paid by
the insurance industry.design of the over-the-counter products may further
limit investors’ability to change their positions. A con-
tingent surplus note or catastrophe bond issuer does not
face basis risk, because claim payments can be offset
with the proceeds received when the securities are
issued. Investors in both instruments bear credit risk
because they face possible issuer default. They also face
the risk of adverse selection if only those companies
with larger than average catastrophe risk issue securi-
ties. Investors need to take such possibilities into account
when evaluating a security’s coupon payment. Because
moral hazard incentives depend on how directly repay-
ment is linked to the issuer’s own catastrophe costs,
investors can reduce this risk by buying securities in
which repayment is determined by an industrywide fig-
ure rather than by a company-specific one.
Property Catastrophe Swaps. The swaps exchange,
scheduled to begin operating in October 1996, will be an
electronic exchange run by the Catastrophe Risk
Exchange (CATEX). Insurance swap instruments will
enable primary insurers, reinsurers, and self-insurers to
diversify their risks by trading blocks of insurance poli-
cies in different regions of the United States. Each swap
will be a bilateral agreement, creating reciprocal reinsur-
ance between two insuring entities. Participation in this
exchange will be more limited than in the options or over-
the-counter markets: only the bearers of insurance risk—
insurers, reinsurers, or self-insurers registered with the
New York State Insurance Department—can take part.
Property catastrophe risk varies by location, and par-
ticipants will be able to swap types of risk (for example,
hurricane risk on the North Carolina coast for tornado
risk in Kansas). The units of exchange will be standard-
ized in terms of equivalent risks and exposure. A trad-
ing unit will be $1 million of insured property risk, and
risks will be classified by location and peril. The
exchange will report the proportional relationship
between different risks, called “relativities.”  Although
industrywide catastrophe risk in the United States and
its regions, as well as in the states of California,
Florida, or Texas, is reflected in option prices, swap rel-
ativities represent more specific catastrophe risks. For
example, one unit of Los Angeles earthquake exposure
may be equivalent to two units of Long Island wind-
storm exposure. The supply and demand for each type
of risk will determine the relativities.
The design of property catastrophe swaps will deter-
mine which market participants bear which type of risk.
Since swaps are not currently trading, volume and the
associated liquidity risk are unknown. Volume will
depend on insurers’demand for catastrophe risk diver-
sification. Although very few insurers are concentrated
in the three high-risk states, there may be small insurers
with policies concentrated in other high-risk areas,
such as the New Jersey coast. 
As for credit risk, each swap participant will be
exposed to its counterparty’s risk of default because the
swaps exchange will not serve as a clearinghouse guar-
anteeing trades. Basis risk will depend on the payment
conditions of each individual swap agreement:  if each
party’s individual claim payments determine its coun-
terparty’s payments, basis risk will be eliminated;  if
each party’s payments are based on an industry aggre-
gate, both swap participants will face basis risk.
Certain attributes of the swap design will reduce
adverse selection and moral hazard incentives.
Prohibiting swap participants from transferring all of
their polices will encourage careful policy management
and lessen moral hazard. The potential for mispricing
associated with adverse selection will be reduced
because swap participants will be required to provide
policy and claim data to their counterparties. In addi-
tion, the exchange will randomly select the policies to
be swapped, preventing insurers from trading only their
highest risk policies.
Conclusion
By establishing a direct link between the insurance
industry and the capital market, catastrophe risk instru-
ments introduce the strategic advantages of the finan-
cial markets to the insurance industry. Not only do
these instruments provide insurers with more hedging
alternatives, they also enable investors to participate in
the property catastrophe risk market. Consequently,
property catastrophe risk can be spread across a
broader pool of individuals and businesses, reducing
the impact of catastrophes on individual insurance
companies and the insurance industry as a whole. 
Since catastrophe risk instruments are relatively new
financial products, their low trading volume currently
exposes market participants to high liquidity risk.
However, trading volume should rise as exchanges,
underwriters, and insurers make these instruments
more accessible and investors and other market partici-
pants become more familiar with them. Increased vol-
ume should then reduce liquidity risk and promote
more competitive pricing.
Notes
1. A property catastrophe causes insured property damage in excess
of $5 million and affects more than 1,000 policyholders.
2. Losses are aggregate insurance industry claims and have been
adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index as of year-end
1995 (data provided by Property Claim Services of Rahway, 
New Jersey).
3. Catastrophe risk relates to the value of property insured by indi-
viduals and businesses. When a catastrophe occurs, insurance com-
panies receive claims from a variety of insurance policies, including
homeowners and renters insurance policies.
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4. Over half of the costliest catastrophes since 1950 were earth-
quakes and hurricanes (data provided by Property Claim Services).
5. The percentage of renters with insurance increased from 28 to 
41 percent between 1984 and 1993. During this period, the ratio of
homeowners to renters was stable (Insurance Information Institute
1996).
6. A company is considered concentrated if at least 20 percent of its
written premiums are in one of the following insurance lines:
earthquake in California and homeowners multiple peril in Florida,
Texas, or California.
7. The insurers concentrated in California, Florida, or Texas repre-
sent 1 percent of the insurance industry’s premiums for all prop-
erty-casualty insurance lines and 4 percent of the industry’s premi-
ums in the following insurance lines:  earthquake in California and
homeowners multiple peril in Florida, Texas, or California. Data
were provided by A.M. Best of Oldwick, New Jersey.
8. All reinsurance price and coverage figures were provided by Guy
Carpenter & Company, Inc., a reinsurance broker and major source
of reinsurance industry data located in New York City. 
9. The concept of exchange-traded insurance has been discussed for
the last twenty years. For example, see Goshay and Sandor (1973).
10. Property Claim Services, a not-for-profit company that provides
information and analysis on property insurance business issues, is
the single source within the insurance industry for identifying 
catastrophes and aggregating the corresponding insurance costs.
11. Property catastrophe options represent a type of option known
as a European option, which can be exercised only on its expiration
date. The other type of option, an American option, can be exer-
cised  before or on its expiration date. The Chicago Board of Trade
introduced the current catastrophe options (called PCS catastrophe
options because the index is provided by Property Claim Services)
in September 1995. The futures and options introduced in 1992 and
terminated at the end of 1995 were American options that used an
index based on insurance industry loss ratios provided by the
Insurance Services Office, Inc., of New York City.
12. Catastrophe options have four specifications:  strike value, geo-
graphic region, contract period, and development period (that is, the
time during which loss estimates affect the loss indexes computed
by Property Claim Services). The geographic regions include
national, eastern, northeastern, southeastern, midwestern, and west-
ern, as well as the states of California, Florida, and Texas. Contract
periods are quarterly for all regions except California and western,
which are annual.
13. See Niehaus and Mann (1992) for a discussion of moral hazard and
adverse selection incentives with reinsurance and futures contracts.
14. Surplus is an insurance company’s statutory net worth. Surplus
notes are subordinated debt obligations and are considered equity
capital (surplus) for statutory purposes. Because mutual insurers
cannot issue stock, they are the largest issuers of surplus notes. 
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